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Introduction 
At the international level, especially among donors involved in development cooperation, there is an 
intense debate underway on the best way to achieve a broad-based, high-quality and affordable supply 
of services designed to help improve the performance and consolidate the competitiveness of SMEs. 
These services are referred to as Business Development Services (BDS). This discussion is gaining 
momentum at a time when public funds are growing increasingly scarce and the pressure to modernize 
SMEs in developing countries is rising. The obvious failure of governments and donor agencies to 
significantly improve the supply of services for SMEs has led to a paradigm shift. The new paradigm 
calls for the development of undistorted private service markets rather than highly subsidised services 
provided by government agencies or international donors. 
As regards the new paradigm, a number of key issues – both conceptual and practical – remain unre-
solved, leaving the practitioner with serious difficulties when it comes to designing and implementing 
support programmes, e.g.  
What is the best approach to addressing the phenomenon of “public goods” in situations where market 
forces cannot be expected to provide the socially optimal solution; what can be done under real-world 
conditions, where no first-best solution has yet developed for an efficient and differentiated market for 
business services?  
What is the best way to manage the transition from a government- and supply-side-oriented, bureau-
cratic system to high-performance private BDS markets?  
How are practitioners to deal with the fact that support programmes have tended to be overlaid by 
political interests? 
The present document has been written on the request of GTZ Thailand. It takes up the conceptual 
debate on BDS market development and discusses its usefulness for the Thai case, which is – as in 
most developing countries – characterized by a highly traditional state-led approach to BDS provision. 
This exercise has allowed us to address the issues raised above and to test the relevance and scope of 
BDS recommendations in the real world. For instance, we take a differentiated look at the types of 
services to be provided. This helps to single out situations where BDS may indeed be provided on a 
purely market basis, and where donor intervention should thus be limited to assisting in the creation of 
these markets. On the other hand, it may also help us to understand that as far as a number of highly 
important BDS, and especially those related to SMEs, are concerned, market failure is a reality and not 
merely a lame excuse for governments to maintain an expensive and inefficient public service sector. 
Moreover, the present paper addresses the political dimension of BDS provision, a factor important to 
understanding why governments and donors do not always follow the recommendations derived from 
technical best practices, and discusses what practitioners can do in the (quite common) situations in 
which BDS markets are already distorted and politicians and bureaucrats are unwilling to leave BDS 
provision to market forces. All in all, our study thus highlights the difficulties involved in translating 
textbook recommendations into the real-world scenarios. This leads us to present a number of policy 
conclusions which, perhaps not as spectacular as the “new paradigm,” are nevertheless more realistic 
when it comes to implementation in the given institutional and political context of contemporary Thai-
land as well as in other countries with similar institutional settings.  
The study is based on desk research on the BDS concept as well as on the available empirical evi-
dence. In addition, we conducted a number of interviews with GTZ project managers and Thai coun-
terparts during the spring of 2003. In coming up with our general assessment of Thailand’s institu-
tional performance in business services, we draw on a parallel GDI research project with a much 
broader empirical base.1 
                                                     
1  Altenburg et al. (2003). 
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Chapter 1 summarizes the new BDS paradigm, presenting the four principle arguments that cast doubt 
on the traditional path taken by state- or donor-led service provision as well as the policy conclusions 
made by proponents of the BDS market approach. Chapter 2 then identifies four conceptual and prac-
tical limitations of this school of thought. Chapters 3-6 go on to elaborate on these four critical argu-
ments. Chapter 3 discusses the distinction between public and private goods, arguing that some busi-
ness services are, at least in part, public goods, and concluding that there is a case for subsidizing 
them. In Chapter 4 we show that the evolution of private service markets is a slow process of interac-
tion between customers and service providers. These interactions serve to increase specialization and 
deepen the division of labour, thus contributing to productivity growth, innovation and competitive-
ness. Government action aimed at accelerating this process may thus be assumed to spur economic 
development. Chapter 5 demonstrates that service provision for SMEs is a political issue. Some politi-
cians and bureaucrats clearly pursue self-interests which may not be compatible with the new para-
digm of undistorted private service markets. Development of such markets is therefore not a techno-
cratic project but one that requires political bargaining. In Chapter 6 we point out that the development 
of service markets never starts from scratch. Usually there are already a number of established subsi-
dized, and often bureaucratic, service providers. This leads us to discuss the challenge of how to pro-
pel these service providers towards business-like modes of service delivery. Finally, Chapter 7 draws 
some practical conclusions for development co-operation.  
1 The New Paradigm of BDS Markets 
One crucial condition for competitiveness of SMEs in developing countries is their ability to link up 
with other companies or institutions that can provide them with assets which they cannot produce 
themselves, i.e. support that permits them to increase flexibility and reduce costs. This is one of the 
most important findings of the “systemic competitiveness approach,” but also of the research focusing 
on industrial clusters and districts.2 Many of these external linkages include provision of some kind of 
services to SMEs.3 During the last few years a new paradigm has emerged with regard to who should 
provide these business services and how these services should be provided. The main contributions to 
this new paradigm have come from the Committee of Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise Develop-
ment, which published the study “Business Development Services for Small Enterprises – Guiding 
Principles for Donor Intervention.”4 
The Donor Committee criticizes the traditional approach involving provision of services by public or 
semi-public entities. The most important alleged weaknesses are: 
— Lack of financial sustainability. Most services are delivered on a highly subsidised basis. Ser-
vice providers thus depend on continuous public support. In view of the fact that most countries 
are cutting back on public expenditure, they are forced to cancel or substantially reduce many 
support measures.  
— Insufficient outreach. Even in times marked by high government revenues or deficit spending, 
or substantial inflows of foreign aid, business services usually only reach a relatively small per-
centage of the target group.  
— Lack of business orientation. Public service providers often operate on the logic of public ad-
ministration, e.g. budget allocation is not linked to programme performance, employees do not 
act in a business-like fashion, and beneficiaries are not treated as clients. Incentives – both for 
                                                     
2  See e.g. Esser et al. (1996), Altenburg / Hillebrand / Meyer-Stamer (1998), Malmberg / Maskell (2001). 
3  In fact it is difficult to define what a “service” is. The term is used for a wide range of (beneficial) relationships between 
two entities that are not based on the exchange of physical goods. 
4  For details, see the Preface of: Committee of Donor Agencies (2001). 
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support institutions in general and for the personnel working within these institutions – are often 
not designed to actively search for linkages with the business sector and to strive for client satis-
faction.  
— Poor quality. Since service providers and clients work in accordance with different incentive 
systems, operational routines, and even different mindsets, service supply is often not tailored to 
the needs of clients. In addition, products delivered at low cost or for free may “induce a debili-
tating dependency and cynicism over quality and value.”5  
— Crowding out of private competitors. Service delivery at highly subsidized rates distorts markets 
and hampers the emergence of commercially viable service providers.  
As Box 1 shows, Thailand is no exception to this general picture. 
High cost and low impact may be seen as the major factors propelling the paradigm shift in BDS pro-
vision towards a demand-led and market-based approach. The consensus within the Donor Committee 
expressed in the “Guiding Principles” reflects the conviction that mobilising market forces may be the 
most powerful tool to achieve impact, outreach and (financial) sustainability in the provision of BDS 
to SMEs: 
                                                     
5  Gibson (1999, 4). 
Box 1: Shortcomings of government-driven BDS provision in Thailand 
Government BDS programs in Thailand are mainly driven by bureaucratic decisions, a fact that reflects weak 
private sector involvement in program design as well as incentive structures within implementing agencies 
which serve neither to create a service mentality nor to enhance networking with industry. Many subsidies are 
allocated to hire university professors, even though the latter are usually without much private-sector experi-
ence and are generally viewed as not being sufficiently business-minded and lacking a “hands-on” mentality. 
Despite generous subsidies, a significant number of firms drop out of BDS programs. This casts serious doubts 
on the quality of and appreciation for these programs.  
The lack of business orientation in policy design and delivery results in low program outreach and impact. 
Even the most prominent SME programs, including Invigorating Thai Business (ITB) or the Industrial Tech-
nology Assistance Program (ITAP), cater to a few hundred SMEs only and therefore reach only a very small 
percentage of their potential target group. The same applies, for instance, for lab services (e.g. under the Elec-
trical and Electronics Institute) or the few existing business incubators.  
Programs and implementing agencies are almost never financially sustainable, which means that activities 
suddenly terminate when agencies run out of funds. The ITB program subsidizes 90 % of consultancy costs, 
and its predecessor, the Miyazawa program, which was funded by the Japanese government, even covered 
100 % of these costs. In the case of ITAP, donor countries provide senior experts to SMEs, requiring the host 
companies to cover air fares and per diems only, and ITAP even subsidizes this minimum contribution. If at 
present there are hardly any functioning markets for business services in Thailand (except for routine services 
like tax consultancy or accountancy), this circumstance may in part be attributed to the fact that generous sub-
sidies tend to undermine the willingness of customers to pay for services.  
The current government is committed to improving the delivery of public services. It has required some institu-
tions to substantially raise service fees in order to reach financial sustainability. Moreover, for the first time in 
Thailand, the government plans to introduce performance-based budgeting that calls for definition of perform-
ance indicators and introduction of monitoring and evaluation systems. Implementation, though, is still in its 
infancy. 
Sources: Altenburg et al. (2003); The Brooker Group (2002) 
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“The ultimate vision for BDS, on which these Guiding Principles are based, is of a well-
functioning market with a diverse array of high-quality services that meet the needs of a large 
proportion of SEs [small enterprises] affordably.”6  
The new BDS market paradigm highlights the need for services to be provided at cost-covering rates 
and by providers who operate in a demand-driven and business-like manner. Service providers should 
either be private companies or public entities organized like firms in terms of their incentives systems, 
personnel, culture and attitudes. Services should be regarded as commercial products, and the compa-
nies that receive services should be regarded as customers rather than beneficiaries. Providers should 
therefore always charge fees, and these fees should usually be high enough to secure the provider's 
financial sustainability. This presupposes that BDS organizations use cost-analysis systems that enable 
them to determine the total cost and the adequate price of each service product they provide. Competi-
tion among service providers should serve to induce them to constantly improve on performance. In 
any case, the aim should be to avoid intervention in well-established service markets that deliver sub-
sidized products which may distort markets and jeopardize other providers. Wherever no service mar-
kets have yet evolved, governments (or donors) should seek to develop commercial BDS firms rather 
than delivering services on their own. This shift is in line with a generalized “new thinking” in devel-
opment cooperation. As Goldmark (1999) states,  
“the spread of capitalist principals throughout the world has affected even the most insulated gov-
ernments and donor institutions. The view that market forces are positive and should be used to 
stimulate growth and development has spurred a wave of “market-based” development projects 
and initiatives, including demand-led intervention.”  
2 Shortcomings of the New Paradigm 
There is no doubt that the potential of market forces has been underestimated, or even neglected, in 
development co-operation in the past. The new paradigm expressed in the “Guiding Principles” has 
important merits in that it shows that BDS systems should operate as closely as possible to the market 
if they are to avoid misallocation of resources, optimise cost-benefit ratios and avoid any crowding out 
of private service providers. Yet it is still unclear how realistic the new paradigm is and whether it will 
actually guide development cooperation towards more effective, efficient and sustainable interven-
tions. We will argue that the “Guiding Principles” are too ‘market-optimistic,’ underestimating the 
degree of market failure, and neglect the political dimension of service provision. As a result, they are 
not very helpful for development practitioners who 
— need to identify which services are fully private goods the provision of which should be left to 
market forces, and to determine where government (or donor) intervention may be needed, and 
— want to know how to manage the transition towards a more demand-oriented supply of services 
in a real world which is characterized by political interference, the existence of bureaucratic in-
stitutions that provide market-distorting service programs, and SME customers who are used to 
receiving government services for free.  
It is necessary to take into account four points that limit the leeway for implementing the new para-
digm:  
1. Some business services are “public goods,” and there is a case for subsidizing them. In the 
case of public goods markets cannot be expected to provide the socially optimal solution. Gov-
ernments are willing to subsidise many BDS schemes as they expect the social benefits to out-
weigh the costs. Therefore even in industrialised countries, where service supply is usually of 
quite good quality and firms are able to pay sizable fees, many services are not provided on a 
                                                     
6  See Committee of Donor Agencies (2001, 1). 
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cost-covering basis.7 In developing countries market failure may be even more pervasive. Thus 
it is important to carefully identify which services are actually pure private goods and may and 
should be provided on a market base, and cases in which governments should intervene to 
maximize welfare. One fact that makes things more complicated is that textbook distinctions are 
not very helpful. The “public good” content inherent in a given service depends on the specific 
local and historical context, e.g. the size and maturity of markets.  
2. The development of private service markets is a slow and difficult interactive process. 
Public intervention may be needed to speed it up. In most mature economies a highly diversi-
fied private service sector has developed over time. This is the result of a cumulative and inter-
active process in which increasing product differentiation, shorter product cycles, emphasis on 
customer-specific solutions etc. have spurred the development of business services, and vice 
versa. In the case of less developed countries, we often observe a vicious circle in which 
scarcely differentiated, simple non-service sectors do not create demand for advanced services, 
and lack of such services restricts competitiveness. The relevant questions here are thus: Even if 
a certain type of service could and should in the long run be delivered under market terms, is 
there not still a case for temporary market intervention in order to develop markets and get the 
above-mentioned dynamics going? Can SMEs in developing countries wait for service markets 
to be created, considering the pressures they are facing in times of market liberalisation and 
globalisation?  
3. Service provision for SMEs is a political issue. Governments sometimes provide BDS for 
political reasons, e.g. as a show of public action and to gain support of local communities or 
certain target groups for the government or the ruling party. In such cases they may not be pur-
suing the goal of developing BDS markets, even if this is the most efficient option. The negative 
impacts of market distortion or lack of financial sustainability are in this case traded off against 
the political advantages offered by increased legitimacy. Moreover, bureaucrats working at the 
level of implementing agencies may act as rational and selfish agents who are mainly interested 
in maximizing the budgets of their offices and securing their jobs and salaries. It would there-
fore be naïve to believe that political decision-makers, funding agencies and implementing bod-
ies would change their behaviour once the optimal degree of market intervention has been de-
fined in technical terms.  
4. Reforming public service providers may be a more promising approach than trying to 
substitute private competition for them. Donors and government agencies that wish to im-
prove SME services never start from scratch; instead, they are always forced to deal with estab-
lished traditional, and often inefficient, service systems that distort markets. Even if private pro-
viders were able to guarantee an efficient and massive supply of services, in view of the above-
mentioned interest-group politics and inertia of bureaucracies it would not be realistic to assume 
that these institutions would quickly disappear. For the development practitioner, this raises the 
question of how to manage a gradual transition from bureaucratic, supply-driven and subsidized 
provision to business-like modes of service delivery. The practical challenge is therefore often 
not to substitute government services but to improve them in accordance with the criteria of the 
new paradigm.  
In the following chapters we will elaborate on these four points. As much of the BDS dilemma is due 
to the unclear distinction between public and private goods, we will place emphasis on this aspect, 
developing criteria aimed to help the BDS practitioner to assess the “public good content” inherent in 
different types of business service. The other three arguments will be discussed in less detail.  
                                                     
7  See e.g. the case of Italy in Pietrobelli / Rabelotti (2002). 
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3 Business Services between Public and Private Goods 
3.1 The Role of Market Failure 
The “Guiding Principles” are unambiguous in stating that the majority of BDS can be provided as 
private goods on a commercial basis and that all public intervention should be subordinated to this 
vision. At present, however, no empirical evidence can be found that a broad and smoothly function-
ing provision of high-impact services within a purely market-based system could be achieved within 
an appropriate period of time. The relevant studies show, on the contrary, that cost-recovery rates are 
usually low, even in industrialised countries. In many cases even BDS provided by business-like sup-
pliers are highly dependent on institutional clients, e.g. donor-financed NGOs. We will therefore start 
out by asking why, if “the majority of BDS are private goods,” BDS markets are still highly underde-
veloped or non-existent. There are of course many transitional market failures and artificial distortions 
that may explain this situation; these include: 
— an insufficient flow of information within societies that may tend to prevent new market oppor-
tunities - or other urgent challenges (e.g. the need to adapt to international standards) – from be-
ing quickly identified and to impede appropriate action; 
— insufficiently developed skills and physical capacities needed to provide services of an adequate 
quality; 
— crowding out of private suppliers by highly subsidized government (or donor) services. 
We agree that if market failure is only transitional, or due to previous distortions, donor intervention 
should indeed focus on activities aimed at creating private BDS markets, as outlined in the “Guiding 
Principles” and related documents. Still, we question the assumption that all types of services provided 
to businesses may be considered as purely private goods. The fact that we pose this question is in no 
way meant to defend the traditional system of public service provision, even though in the past “mar-
ket failure” and the “public goods character” of business services have often been used as a lame ex-
cuse to establish and maintain paternalistic and top-down systems of service provision. However, there 
is no “way back” to the old model and the old way of thinking, and a sober and in-depth analysis of 
the potential and limits of market relations would appear to be the only “way out.” 
Concluding (as we will in fact do) that many BDS have in part public goods character does not at all 
mean that they should necessarily be provided by public organisations or that these organisations 
should decide on their own what kinds of services should be provided and in what way. On the con-
trary, the governments of developing countries would be best advised to limit their interventions to 
activities in which the risks of government failure are lower than the costs of market failure. In many 
cases, governments should pull out of direct service provision and pay more attention to creating an 
enabling environment for the development of SMEs.  
However, in cases in which a sober analysis indicates that market failure is apt to impede a market-
based provision of BDS to SMEs, a long-term engagement of public agents could prove necessary, 
including a carefully designed and demand-led transfer of funds. Governments may therefore decide to 
establish or maintain a system of service provision that is not fully market-based. Nevertheless, efforts 
should always be undertaken to avoid any crowding out of private service suppliers, and public funds 
should be used in such a way as to maximise the social benefits of these scarce resources. The system 
therefore has to be as demand-led and business-like as possible.  
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3.2 Towards a Differentiation of Business Services 
Notwithstanding the intense debates within the donor community, there is still a lack of clarity con-
cerning the term “BDS.” Review of the literature8 as well as some unpublished case studies reveals 
that the projects and programmes implemented by the international donor community operate with a 
wide range of different business services. Although the following list is far from complete, BDS may 
include:9 
— training of entrepreneurs and employees, 
— consultancy and advisory services geared to management capabilities, 
— marketing consultancy and marketing of products on a commission basis, 
— provision of information in a broad sense, 
— accounting and legal services, 
— technology development and transfer, 
— provision of basic or specialised services in information and communication technologies (ICT), 
— access to specialised instruments and tools (technology access service), 
— business linkage promotion, 
— design of products and packages, 
— packaging of products, transport and logistics. 
Given this wide range of services, with their different characteristics, it is necessary to group these 
services before we can discuss whether or not they can be provided appropriately on a commercial 
basis. The Donor Committee proposes a differentiation into operational and strategic services, with 
the operational services being those needed for day-to-day operations, while strategic services are used 
by enterprises to address medium- to long-term issues aimed at improving the performance of an en-
terprise, its access to markets, and its ability to compete. This provides a useful first approach to the 
issue. Yet to come up with a more detailed differentiation,10 and to discuss some characteristics rele-
vant to the marketability of the respective group of services, we consider it important to look more 
thoroughly at the reasons why an enterprise may be willing to seek a service and to pay for it.  
3.3 Operational Business Services 
In keeping with our differentiation, operational business services (OBS) are mainly private goods that 
have a direct and predictable outcome on a firm’s performance. Most of them are necessary for day-to-
day operations. These characteristics imply a relatively high degree of marketability. It is useful to 
distinguish three different OBS:  
— Practically every enterprise needs access to some services to carry out its basic functions. These 
services, which we term basic operational services (BOS), vary in time and space but can quite 
easily be defined in any given situation. BOS may be subdivided into services that necessarily 
have to be obtained externally (telephone, grid electricity) and those that may also be provided 
                                                     
8  See for instance the BDS documents listed on the CEFE homepage (http://cefe.gtz.de). 
9  We believe, however, that some transactions dealt with in a number of BDS papers should not be labelled “services”, 
e.g. the commercialisation of a small enterprise’s (A) products by a marketing company (B), when the underlying trans-
action is the selling of the good from A to B and B’s utility is based on a mark-up on the buying price. This transaction 
may include service provision by B to A (e.g. advice in design or quality management, see e.g. Mikkelsen 1999), but in 
itself it amounts to the formation of a value chain and not a service. 
10  A similar structure is presented in Mifflín (2001, 7f.). 
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internally, like the transport of inputs and final products. In the second case the question of 
whether a service linkage will emerge depends on a (sometimes complex) “make or buy” deci-
sion.  
— A second, rather small group of OBS are those which an enterprise (usually from a certain size 
upwards) is obliged to contract to comply with laws and regulations. The most important of 
these “Legally Required Operational Services” (LROS) are legal/notary and accounting ser-
vices as well as the use of certain laboratories and certifying agencies. For SMEs, contracting 
external providers is usually the only viable way to obtain these services, since the volume of 
their operations does not permit them to permanently employ specialists in these areas. 
— A third group of OBS - even though they may not be strictly necessary for the operation of an 
enterprise - will have a direct and predictable outcome on its productivity, efficiency and ability 
to compete. Typical examples of this kind of “Advanced Operational Services” (AOS) would 
include the contracting of a specialist in product design, the introduction of an enterprise re-
source planning (ERP) software or access to specialised instruments or tools for the production 
process.  
With respect to the three groups of OBS, we largely share the assumptions of the Donor Committee 
that they constitute private goods. The main characteristics of private goods are that they have clearly 
identified owners and that they are rival and excludable, i.e. that the owner can prevent others from 
using or consuming a good or service in question. These characteristics are clearly given. When a 
company buys a telephone line, it will be the registered as owner of the line and be able to exclude 
others from using it (BOS). The time an attorney dedicates to make up a contract for an individual 
company cannot be shared by another company unless it shares the costs (LROS). And when a small 
textile company contracts for a number of hours of work with a specialized piece of equipment to 
make high-quality buttonholes or computerized embroidery,11 this will add value to its products 
(AOS). Any competitor who wants to do the same will have to pay for the service individually.  
A second characteristic of the three groups of OBS is that they are, in their majority, “search goods,” 
i.e. the contractor knows in advance what the concrete result of his investment will be, even though he 
may not always be able to predict the outcome on his enterprise’s performance. Therefore the two 
parties may define relatively clearly – prior to contracting the service – the terms of reference of the 
relationship as well as the criteria for client satisfaction. In many cases the supplier of the service may 
provide samples of earlier work done (e.g. in package design) or give the client an opportunity to talk 
to previous clients (as in the case of customised ERP software).  
Due to the private and search character of such goods, the Donor Committee is basically right in stat-
ing that “with appropriate product design, delivery and payment mechanisms, (these services) can be 
provided on a commercial basis even for the lowest-income segment of the entrepreneurial SE sec-
tor.”12 Still, we argue that there is market failure even in OBS, and that there may be a case for gov-
ernment (or donor) intervention. Where such interventions are considered to be necessary, they should 
usually be temporary and geared to market creation, and it should be borne in mind that in principle 
these OBS should be marketable. OBS provision may not be adequate and affordable because:  
— Due to their low consumer density and purchasing power, rural areas are often under-supplied 
with OBS, e.g. with basic telephony and grid electricity. The same is true, of course, for high-
end OBS such as Internet access or services that permit the outsourcing of complex business 
functions (call centres etc.). With regard to the grid-dependent OBS, a combination of liberali-
sation, market regulation and selective subsidies is usually adequate to improve the density of 
service supply, even in remote areas of developing countries.  
                                                     
11  See the case of INSOTEC, Colombia; mentioned in Goldmark (1999).  
12 See Committee of Donor Agencies (2001, 1). 
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— Information about the supply and demand of OBS is often inadequate. Several information-
related problems can be identified that limit the functioning of OBS markets within the SME 
sector of developing countries, mainly with regard to AOS. The potential client may not be in-
formed about the services that are currently offered and basic market conditions. He may mis-
judge the potential benefits of the acquisition of a special service. Finally, he may not be aware 
of the costs related to providing the BOS internally and not contracting an external supplier.13  
— With respect to some OBS, SMEs may suffer from indivisibility problems on the supply side. 
Specialised laboratories, packaging or warehousing services may need a minimum of product 
movement to cover their fixed operation costs. In these cases it may be difficult for SMEs to 
find an adequate supply of services in their area of operation.14  
3.4 Strategic Business Services 
Strategic business services (SBS) are services that enhance the long-term capacity of an enterprise to 
compete, mainly by enriching its knowledge base and/or by increasing its capability to acquire, pro-
cess and apply information. This group is mainly composed of training, consultancy and advisory ser-
vices, provision of information, research and development, and some forms of technology develop-
ment and transfer. Moreover, the outcome of SBS is indirect rather than direct, long-term rather than 
short-term, and, finally, uncertain and in many cases unpredictable. The following characteristics 
make market failure evident, and here it is unlikely that the market creation approach will work: 
— Many SBS suffer from non-appropriability. The social return from investment is for this reason 
generally higher than the private return. In other words: If it relied exclusively on private deci-
sions, investment in these services would be lower than socially desirable. This is true for R&D 
services, training and information provision, where private investments may even benefit com-
petitors by dint of labour turnover or leakage of know-how. In some cases, the expected positive 
impact is related less to the individual enterprise than to collective entities (e.g. cluster policies, 
promotion of given locations) or even to public goods (e.g. introduction of environmental man-
agement systems). 
— Some SBS, i.e. consultancy and business advisory services, have a highly uncertain and unpre-
dictable outcome that cannot be assessed prior to the transaction. This means that the decision-
maker (in contrast to the case of the above-mentioned search goods) not only faces risks – as he 
does in each and every investment decision – but that he faces risks without being able to assess 
the potential benefits and dangers. Either he must rely on the service provider, believing that the 
expected outcome will actually be reached (trust goods), or he may be willing to contract for the 
service because of positive results in the past (experience goods).  
Donor intervention often seeks to respond to the problem of uncertainty either by generating trust rela-
tionships between service providers and recipients or by subsidising the first use made of a special 
service, anticipating repeated transactions based on the experience generated. Both measures are use-
ful when there is a sufficient number of service providers that merit trust and may actually be able to 
provide high-quality services at an affordable price. However, coming up with an accurate assessment 
of this may be very difficult not only for the SME itself but for donors and service facilitators as well, 
especially when new kinds of services are to be offered and new service providers are expected to 
enter the market. In the case of misjudgements or a severe discrepancy between promised and real 
outcome, facilitation of personal contacts or first experiences may, contrary to what is intended, result 
in disincentives to further service contracting. 
                                                     
13  Phansalkar / Sriram (2001, 54). 
14  There are, however, exceptions from the “size rule,” e.g. technology access services may be especially in demand from 
SME that cannot afford own specialised equipment. See Goldmark (1999). 
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As for the strategy of subsidising first service contracts and subsequently outphasing public or donor 
support, this may give rise to additional problems because many BDS, and especially high-end ones, 
cannot – due to their character and content – be used repeatedly, in particular in the case of SMEs. A 
small company may e.g. contract for a consultancy for the purpose of re-engineering its production 
process. Once this is accomplished, there will probably be no need for any second re-engineering for 
quite a long time. This may be very different in the case of large branch firms that may subsequently 
restructure their processes, thus capitalising the experiences of foregoing consultancies when contract-
ing for the next one. We find similar conditions with regard to a series of other BDS such as R&D 
contracts or market surveys. So the approach involving “market creation through the generation of 
positive experiences” may find its limits in the low demand for repeated service provision.  
Box 2: Non-appropriability: the examples of training and information services 
Training is an important SBS product in international development cooperation. It enhances the capacities of 
the entrepreneur or of his employees to meet their functions in an effective, efficient and quality-oriented 
way. When employees attend a training course, the additional knowledge will subsequently remain incorpo-
rated in the trained person – but there is no guarantee that this person will remain with the company that con-
tracted for the training. It is evident that in countries that suffer from a lack of qualified human resources and 
in which personnel fluctuation tends to be high, the risk that trained people may switch to a better-paying 
organisation is higher than in the industrialised world. In many cases, due to a lack of adequate legislation or 
problems with law enforcement, there is no possibility for the company to recover the training costs when this 
occurs. So in deciding whether or not to train his personnel, the entrepreneur has to take into account the 
highly realistic risk that he will be paying for training while his competitor benefits from the results. This is 
an obvious case of “non-appropriability,” and thus of market failure.a 
Even if the trained person stays with the organisation, the company may face additional costs due to his en-
hanced bargaining position and higher salary expectations – an additional reason why many enterprises are 
reluctant to train their employees. This partly explains the preferences given to internal on-the-job training 
that endows the employee with additional knowledge without providing him with a formal title that he might 
use in subsequent bargaining processes. In some countries, e.g. in Mexico, companies are legally obliged to 
train their personnel. Here, in some ways, training could be seen as a legally required operational service 
(LROS). This may easily lead to a bias in the market towards low-cost and generic training, with costs easy to 
recover, like language courses. (see e.g. Adler 2000).  
While the private benefit of training may be low due to problems of non-appropriability, it is obvious that in 
developing countries there is an urgent need to enhance capabilities and training levels of the labour force and 
the population in general. Thus the social benefit of training is higher than the private benefit, and there is a 
strong case for investing public money in the establishment of a properly functioning training system.  
A similar situation can be found with regard to information provision to SMEs. This may take on very differ-
ent forms, extending from provision of generic information to client-specific R&D-contracts. What they have 
in common is that the recipient of the information can not be sure that the information he is acquiring will 
only be available to him. This may not be a problem when the client only has to pay the marginal costs of 
reproducing generic information. But it definitely is a problem when the information he pays for is high-cost 
and of strategic importance, as in the case of specialised market surveys or technological information gained 
through R&D contracts. In these cases the costs of acquiring the desired information externally are high, 
while the probability that the client will remain the only beneficiary of the information is rather low. Even in 
the industrialised countries it is very difficult to keep strategic business information secret; usually it is not 
possible to avoid “know-how drain.” This is even more the case in countries where intellectual property rights 
are not effectively enforced. 
a An exception can be seen in the case in which the business owner and contractor of the training measure 
is identical to the trained person. In this case, the decision-maker can be sure that he will benefit from the 
investment. This may explain the relative success of training programmes such as CEFE, which are ori-
ented towards the capabilities of the entrepreneur himself; see also the examples in Tomecko (2000, 51f). 
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3.5 OBS and SBS: A Gradual Difference Rather than a Clear-cut 
Distinction 
The distinction between different types of OBS and SBS makes it easier to discuss the private or pub-
lic goods character of each of these services, the possibility that they thus may be provided on a 
merely commercial basis and the need for and possible approaches to donor intervention. Neverthe-
less, the above classification by no means draws a clear-cut division between different categories of 
services. The following examples show that in practice there may be difficulties in assigning special 
services to one of the groups mentioned above: 
— How would we e.g. classify the advisory service provided to prepare an enterprise to be certified 
as per ISO 9000ff? On the one hand, the process clearly enhances the long-term internal capaci-
ties of the company, thus suggesting classification as “SBS.” On the other hand, once obtained, 
the certificate itself is a tangible outcome of the process that may under certain conditions en-
hance the market position of the enterprise in a very direct way. So it would also fit under the 
category of “AOS.”  
— Equally, it is quite evident that the dividing line between BOS and AOS will not remain unal-
tered over time. To cite an example: Many services, like grid electricity or access to a telephone 
that may today be considered as basic at least for formal enterprises of a given minimum size, 
may have been regarded as “AOS” only few decades ago.  
— The same may turn out to be true for Internet access, today clearly an AOS in most parts of the 
developing world, but one that is likely to have become a basic and indispensable business tool 
in only a few years.  
— Transport may be considered a BOS for all goods-producing enterprises, but it may just as well 
contain marked elements of an AOS when it is bundled with warehousing, data processing etc. 
by a modern logistics company.  
Obviously, the proposed categorization cannot be applied as a simple one-size-fits-all solution. Firstly, 
because differences are gradual rather than clear-cut. This is explained in Box 3. Secondly, because 
the categorization – and thus the inherent public good content as well as the marketability of a given 
business service – depends on many specific circumstances, e.g. on general development levels as well 
as on locational factors. Nevertheless, it does provide elements which may help us to determine where 
market-led BDS provision is likely to work.  
Box 3: Examples of operational and strategic business services according to their character as 
public and private goods 
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4 Speeding up the Development of Markets: A Public Role for the 
Transitional Period  
Competitiveness, productivity growth and economic welfare require continuous innovations which 
make possible product differentiation, shorter product cycles and the development of new markets. 
Innovation is a cumulative and interactive process. As economic structures become more differenti-
ated, and intangible assets (such as knowledge, experience, brand image) grow increasingly important, 
the innovation process becomes far more complex and involves an increasing number of firms and 
institutions. To name only a few manifestations: supply chains become more integrated; increasingly 
complex standards are introduced; user-producer interactions increase in number and scope; compa-
nies form strategic alliances to engage in joint research or marketing; linkages emerge between the 
private sector and public research centres, regulatory bodies and other institutions grow far more 
dense; and the “turbulence”15 in enterprise structures increases - all of which becomes evident when 
we look at the figures for mergers, acquisitions and spin-offs. Under these dynamic conditions net-
work coordination – e.g. knowledge flows, harmonization of interests, management of logistical inter-
faces – assumes crucial importance. This calls for differentiated and efficient BDS, which may be 
termed the lubricant of modern production structures, providing important externalities for the rest of 
the economy.  
It is one of the key features of underdevelopment that the differentiated and interactive economic 
structures typical of industrialized countries have not yet developed in most countries of the South. 
Developing countries typically lack competitive firms, and the degree of interfirm and institutional 
specialization is low. This leads to a vicious circle in which scarcely differentiated, simple non-service 
sectors do not demand advanced services and the lack of such services restricts competitiveness. Un-
der these conditions, the increasing competition emanating from market liberalization and globalisa-
tion may destroy the few promising “germ cells” for economic development that exist in developing 
countries.  
Viewed from this perspective, a minimalist approach towards government action in support of BDS 
may not be adequate. Considering the long periods required for interactive productive systems to de-
velop, as well as in view of the often adverse framework conditions prevalent in developing countries, 
it is obvious that the establishment of efficient and sustainable BDS provision systems and user-
producer interaction can hardly be expected to mature as an organic, purely market-driven process in 
the short run. Carefully directed government or donor intervention may be needed to ensure a high-
quality service supply that contributes to the development of highly specialized, interactive and inno-
vative firms which in turn generate demand for more differentiated and efficient business services. 
Setting this virtuous circle in motion may justify an integrated proactive approach, including the set-
ting of national standards, enforcement of laws and regulations, organization of consumer interests to 
create pressure to improve performance, training of future private service providers, temporary subsi-
dies for customers who use innovative services, etc. It may be too short-sighted to overstate the need 
for financial sustainability at the level of the BDS provider without looking at the productive system as 
a whole. Box 4 gives an example of how GTZ, together with its counterparts in Thailand, is seeking to 
create the conditions required for a new service market in a situation where both supply and demand 
are still negligible.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
15  Audretsch (2001, 11 ff). 
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Many public service providers in Thailand justify their intervention on the grounds that they are deep-
ening and upgrading the productive structure. The specific services needed for these new and more 
demanding activities are not yet locally available. In these cases, providers argue that their services – 
although heavily subsidized – contribute to creating future demand, e.g. when they convince custom-
ers of the benefits of counselling, when they contribute to making BDS markets more transparent, or 
when they serve to develop new BDS products. In principle, this argument is convincing, although it 
may sometimes be used as an excuse for superfluous and market-distorting interventions. In practice it 
is often difficult to determine whether the alleged long-term market-creating effects outweigh the pos-
sible negative effect of non-sustainable market interventions. Box 5 gives some examples of donor 
interventions which address this trade-off.  
As we have seen, there often is a trade-off between a “politically correct” market orientation of gov-
ernment action or donor intervention and the urgent need to shape conditions and create resources that 
enhance competitiveness and economic welfare. Support for BDS may be needed to accelerate a cu-
mulative process of industrial deepening and upgrading. Moreover, there may be other highly respect-
able reasons to deviate from the course of market creation, e.g. to seek to guarantee adequate employ-
ment and living conditions in peripheral regions and to avoid rural-urban migration. 
 
Box 4: Creating a market for environmental management systems in Thailand 
One component of Thai-German development cooperation aims at developing environmental management 
systems (EMS) in Thai companies. EMS are an important tool for eco-efficient production and should in 
principle contribute both to reducing negative environmental impacts and increasing the competitiveness of 
firms. Yet many of the necessary measures, e.g. pollution control, do not pay off immediately. Consequently, 
as long as environmental regulations are not in place (or not enforced), there is no incentive for business 
owners and managers to implement EMS. As a result, demand for EMS and related services is almost nil, and 
there are hardly any specialized service providers available in Thailand.  
At the firm level, GTZ is currently working with only 12 “pilot companies.” Outreach is thus negligible. 
Service fees are graduated, with decreasing subsidies for successive services. Moreover, government subsi-
dies for consultancies, e.g. the ITB programme, are being used as well. All in all, the introduction of EMS 
does not conform to the Guiding Principles of BDS.   
Nevertheless, this may be an important integrated contribution to developing a new market for EMS-related 
services, including measures to improve the general framework conditions as well as supply-side and de-
mand-side elements. GTZ activities include awareness-building; high-level policy advice tailored to improv-
ing environmental laws and regulations (e.g. “Economic Instruments Act”); formulation of technical guide-
lines for EMS; development of sector-specific EMS tools and pilot testing in factories; establishment of an 
EMS certification system as well as an accredited training institute for EMS auditors, consultants and emis-
sion control officers at the company level; development of curricula; and establishment of a complaint centre 
where citizens can report environmental offences, thus generating pressure for companies to adopt cleaner 
technologies. If this approach succeeds (which will depend mainly on the political will to pass and enforce 
stricter environmental laws) it will create demand for, among other things,: laboratory services, auditing and 
certification services, engineering services, emission control, monitoring, and management training. Already 
at this early stage, GTZ is seeking to train and work together with private local service providers wherever 
possible. 
Source: Interviews with GTZ program staff 
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5 The Political Economy of BDS  
BDS provision is a political issue, and the public sector groups involved, e.g. politicians and bureau-
crats, as well as the beneficiaries in the private sector usually pursue self-interests which may not be 
fully in line with the goal of improving the efficiency of service delivery. 
Politicians, political parties and governments sometimes design and implement BDS programs with 
a view to enhancing the legitimacy of their rule. Legitimacy is needed to convince the public to sup-
port or at least accept the rulers and their programs. In addition to discursive appellations, this usually 
implies using government resources to provide public goods, especially in areas which are highly visi-
ble to the public. Besides construction of infrastructure, programs in support of small local enterprises 
are often used for this purpose. If we assume that a government succeeds in applying the new BDS 
model, i.e. completely privatises BDS markets, thereby improving the efficiency and outreach of ser-
vices while cutting down on public expenditure, this will at the same time reduce its visibility. Politi-
cians may therefore wish to continue providing some services which allow them to improve their im-
age as strong supporters of private-sector-led economic development. The higher the subsidies trans-
ferred to beneficiaries, the more determined the latter’s political backing for the government will usu-
ally be. This may deter politicians from pursuing a market-oriented BDS approach. Box 6 provides 
examples of such political “pet projects” from Thailand.  
Moreover, politicians may gain legitimacy by supplying ideological wants. For instance, governments 
which owe their rule to a leftist (or more generally: public-minded) electorate will usually be more 
inclined to provide public BDS schemes than governments subscribing to a liberal discourse. 
 
 
 
 
Box 5: Development co-operation in Thailand: between unfair competition and BDS market 
 creation 
Donors in Thailand intervene in many service markets. German donor agencies are usually aware of the risks 
of crowding out local competitors and seek to avoid this effect. For example, the Senior Expert Service and 
CIM state that they second experts only if the respective expertise is not available locally. Yet in practice it is 
impossible to verify this condition, and customers have a strong incentive to hire international experts 
through these programs because their service fees are heavily subsidized. Moreover, several international 
expert services are competing in the Thai market, seeking to place experts from their respective home coun-
tries. This situation does not favour due diligence. Companies may even turn to different agencies to obtain 
several successive consultancies for next to no cost. Still, programme providers may argue that consultants 
often convince hesitant customers of the benefits of business services and identify needs for further services. 
This induces additional demand which may at least in part be provided by local service providers. The net 
effect of the primary intervention would then be market-creating.   
GTZ projects in Thailand appear to be quite careful about market distortion. Even so, strongly subsidized 
service provision is the rule, partly because the projects are tied to government counterparts that lack a busi-
ness-oriented attitude. In some cases, though, projects prepare business plans before launching a new service, 
including a thorough market assessment and cost analysis. Moreover, project managers can normally argue 
plausibly that their interventions have net market-creating effects, with induced demand outweighing possible 
crowding-out effects. Finally, most GTZ managers seek to convince their counterparts of the need to adopt a 
more market-oriented approach and to establish good practices in line with the principles of the International 
Donor Committee. 
Source: Interviews with staff of the relevant institutions 
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Apart from politicians, bureaucrats working at the level of implementing agencies may operate as 
rational and selfish agents who are mainly interested in maximizing the budget of their offices and 
securing their jobs and salaries. It is important to recognize that political decision-makers, funding 
agencies and implementing bodies are not only driven by the desire to increase efficiency in service 
delivery and that they also seek to maximize political gains or particular benefits for their institutions. 
As a result, bureaucrats may produce such services in quantities that are more than socially optimal.16 
Especially in federal political systems where different administrative levels offer support for SMEs, 
this often results in a proliferation of dozens or even hundreds of supporting institutions and pro-
grammes. Lack of coordination between these levels is then not primarily a matter of inability but 
rather pursuit of self-interest.   
Finally, beneficiaries gain from subsidized services. Especially in a policy environment where benefi-
ciaries have long been accustomed to receiving services for free, it will be difficult to switch towards a 
system of market-based service provision. Any steps aimed at withdrawing public subsidies from gov-
ernment schemes may face strong opposition and entail a high political price.  
For the sake of efficiency, political interference on the part of these three groups should be contained 
as far as possible, but it would be naïve to ignore it. For this reason, a critical policy dialogue has to be 
established in order to convince politicians, bureaucrats and beneficiaries alike of the efficiency gains 
to be expected from market-friendly approaches. The current Thai government, for instance, appears 
to be committed to introducing performance-based budgeting in public administration in general. This 
provides a good opportunity to review incentive systems and governance structures for funding and 
implementing agencies involved in BDS provision. 
                                                     
16  Chang (1996, 22 ff). 
Box 6: Political “pet projects” in Thailand 
In Thailand, politicians have launched some BDS programmes which have obviously been designed to gain 
political support rather than to achieve maximum efficiency. Some programmes completely disregard the 
need for financial sustainability and do little to improve the respective services and performance of BDS 
providers. While ministries and public BDS institutions are increasingly obligated to introduce performance 
indicators and monitor them with a view to increasing the efficiency of service delivery, higher levels of 
government often interfere with politically motivated, ad hoc decisions, sidestepping questions about the 
policy coherence and long-term commitment of programmes that have been decided on.  
After the recession following the 1997 financial crisis, the government initiated a deficit-spending strategy to 
stabilize internal demand, partly supported by donor contributions like the Miyazawa Initiative. A consider-
able portion of this money was channelled through SME programs and initiatives for local economic devel-
opment, thus “flooding” the market for SME services, crowding out market-based services and frustrating 
efforts to increase the degree of cost recovery and financial sustainability. What is more, government funds 
were mainly allocated to ministries and “tambons” (= districts) loyal to the ruling Thai-Rak-Thai party. 
One such political “pet project” is the “One Tambon – One Product” OTOP initiative, with an annual budget 
of nearly US$ 20 million. OTOP is a top-down support program for local handicrafts which encouraged pro-
duction but failed to give due attention to marketing and completely neglected aspects of financial and organ-
izational sustainability. OTOP thus has repeated the errors of many donor-financed programs of past decades. 
The OTOP budget was allocated for only two years, and it is completely unclear whether or not the program 
will receive renewed government inputs. Other “pet projects” include support for five sectoral clusters and 
the ITB program. The latter encourages university professors to provide consultancies for SMEs (see above). 
Some observers stated that the programme’s main effect is to increase the personal income of these academ-
ics, thus contributing to politically co-opting this potentially critical group. 
Sources: Altenburg et al. (2003) 
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6 Reforming Public Service Providers 
In many countries BDS provision is mainly (or even almost exclusively) considered to be the duty of 
government agencies. Competition from the private sector is almost non-existent. As we have shown 
in the previous chapter, politicians as well as bureaucrats have good reasons to leave this situation as it 
is. In Thailand for instance, the Department of Technical Cooperation (DTEC) is reluctant to permit 
international donors to establish BDS cooperation with private sector entities. 
In such conditions, any effort to develop undistorted BDS markets faces serious constraints. Govern-
ment agencies will eye new entrants to the service market with distrust rather than support them; these 
entrants will have to compete against heavily subsidized schemes; and customers will not easily be 
convinced to pay cost-covering fees. Donors should thus decide whether to withdraw cooperation in 
SME promotion altogether or to work with government agencies in order to make the system of public 
BDS provision more responsive to private sector needs, improve service delivery, induce competition, 
etc.  
The latter option makes sense only if counterparts are seriously committed to implementing a number 
of necessary changes. In many countries, this commitment cannot be taken for granted, and antagonis-
tic interests of bureaucracies that stand to benefit from the status quo are well-organized. Yet under 
certain circumstances windows of opportunity do exist. In Thailand, the Prime Minister himself has 
put administrative reform high on the political agenda. Some BDS institutions are required to become 
financially self-sustainable, most public institutions are obliged to define key performance indicators 
and monitoring systems, and the government has announced that future budget allocations will be 
more closely linked to evaluation results.  
In this situation donor contributions may be very helpful. International agencies may help in providing 
examples of good practices for BDS delivery, promoting public-private dialogue, both at the level of 
general policy-making and of individual institutions designed to define principles of subsidiarity and 
division of tasks, and providing advice on issues of organizational development, e.g. how to establish 
M&E systems and modify incentive systems. Thai-German development cooperation has therefore 
identified a need to move from public sector-led to market-based service delivery as a general princi-
ple cutting across its different services schemes for SMEs and eco-efficient industries (Box 7).  
For BDS practitioners, this raises a number of questions, e.g. as regards how to gain access to the po-
litical level of policy-making, how to influence performance criteria and incentive structures within 
public counterpart institutions, how government schemes may be used to strengthen private BDS pro-
viders, how best to handle the phasing out of temporary market interventions, etc. The reality in most 
developing countries is marked by highly distorted markets as well as by politicians and bureaucrats 
who pursue selfish interests. The matter at hand is therefore to manage a gradual transition from bu-
reaucratic, supply-driven and subsidized modes of service delivery to more business-like modes rather 
than to try to implement policies aimed at undistorted markets. The following chapter presents some 
practical conclusions for such a gradual transformation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Towards a more effective provision of business services 
German Development Institute  21
7 Practical Conclusions for Development Co-operation 
In order to maximize the impact of development cooperation, all service providers involved in a given 
programme should have a common understanding of BDS delivery. What is needed is a consensus to 
move towards a more business-like and demand-led provision of BDS and involve more private sup-
pliers, without falling into an uncritical market-optimistic opposite. To create this consensus and reach 
agreement on the terms of BDS delivery (e.g. criteria for public support, rates of subsidy, sequencing 
for out-phasing), there is a need for policy dialogue, not only among local service providers but also 
among donor organizations. 
If provision of concrete BDS products is supported, mainly in cooperation with individual BDS-
providing institutions, we consider six aspects to be of paramount importance: 
1. Market assessment and reasoned justification of any public intervention. As we have argued 
above, well-intended government interventions may be harmful for the long-term development of 
BS/BDS markets as they may distort prices, create bad habits and even crowd out private competi-
tors. For this reason, intervention, rather than non-intervention, in BS/BDS markets has to be le-
gitimised on the basis of a clear analysis of the given situation. Donors should only support service 
provision schemes if partners provide convincing arguments for market intervention, and donors 
should require detailed information regarding objectives, means and time-frames. Awareness on 
Box 7: Market-based service delivery as an underlying rationale for Thai-German development 
 cooperation 
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this issue within private sector organisations (chambers, associations) may be enhanced to help 
them identify politically biased service schemes that may be detrimental to the private sector (poor 
service quality and crowding out of private suppliers). Monitoring of the respective service mar-
kets should be repeated from time to time in order to phase out public intervention as private sup-
pliers emerge. 
2. Separating funding from service delivery. Some major problems with subsidised service provi-
sion arise when the service provider and the organisation managing and administering the funds 
are identical. Without any more or less complicated external supervision it is nearly impossible to 
commit this “system” to an efficient and cost-sensitive execution of its tasks. Inefficiencies often 
result from an explicit or implicit obligation to spend available funds in a given period of time, 
disregarding aspects bound up with a careful direction of the measures and the best possible cost-
benefit ratio. In some ways, moral hazard is a feature inherent to this kind of “closed shop” service 
provider. Thus, separation of the two functions is important to raising effectiveness. Moreover, 
separation of funding and delivery functions reduces the risk of crowding out private service sup-
pliers. This is especially the case when private service companies are able to apply for public 
funding. Such competition increases the transparency of service markets, thus providing additional 
information bearing on whether there still is a case for public intervention.  
Problems may arise when suppliers offer services that combine commercial and “strategic” ele-
ments and are therefore eligible for public co-financing. In practice, this is often the case; e.g. 
most business associations provide both public goods (basic sector-specific information, SME 
networking) and commercially viable services. The latter may be important to gain the necessary 
clientele recognition and to update technical expertise about sector-specific needs, which in turn 
are preconditions for efficient advocacy. Some development practitioners argue that their counter-
part institutions have to offer subsidized information services in order to gain access to new cus-
tomers. In such cases, full cost recovery cannot be expected because the respective services are 
seen as unavoidable advertising costs for the development of new service markets. It is therefore 
difficult in practice to trace the “transferred funds” and to exclude unfair competition in commer-
cial services. To handle this problem without creating a complex and expensive monitoring sys-
tem, it would be possible to set up an appeals body to review reported cases of unfair competition, 
e.g. within the funding organisation or within the national competition board. 
3. Improved accountability. Many service providers offer a more or less ample set of different ser-
vices, often without having established an accountability system to measure the cost and the in-
come generated by each service offered. This situation may be detrimental to the service provider 
himself, because important resources may be dedicated to services that are not really relevant for 
the target group. It may also be detrimental to other (private) service providers, because a lack of 
accountability may lead to unintended unfair competition. It is therefore highly important to im-
prove accountability and enable service providers to monitor market success and cost-related as-
pects of each and every service offered. Service providers with a public function or mission may 
then decide to cross-subsidise different services in order to maintain important services that cannot 
be provided on a cost-covering basis. 
4. Monitoring and evaluation of performance. Given the built-in inefficiencies of bureaucracies, 
which are not exposed to competition and sometimes are given to pursuit of self-interests, public 
service provision needs continuous, transparent and independent monitoring and evaluation of per-
formance. The two sub-systems of service provision – funding and delivery – need to be evaluated 
according to different performance criteria. Within the organisation that manages the funds, the 
cost-benefit ratio of the previously established objective(s) should guide the evaluation. At the 
level of service delivery the evaluation should be centred around the proven impact and the effi-
ciency of provider-SME linkages.  
In parallel to the conceptual debate on BDS provision systems, there have been intense discussions 
over what “good performance” means for BDS and how it can be measured. Although substantial 
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progress has been achieved with the Performance Measurement Framework put forward by 
McVay,17 serious methodological problems remain unresolved, e.g. as regards obtaining the nec-
essary data and especially the measurement of service impact on SMEs,18 given that it is difficult 
to prove clear causal connections between inputs and outcome (“attribution gap”). Moreover, there 
are trade-offs between different dimensions of performance (see Box 8). The proposed “perform-
ance triangle” helps to define priorities and establish performance criteria, but the remaining chal-
lenge is to design a performance measurement framework that is both reliable and manageable, 
and thus does not require overly extensive data sets.  
5. Establishing a direct link between performance and resource allocation. Monitoring and 
evaluation are not an objective in their own right but should be used to continuously improve the 
system. The most effective way to ensure the system’s responsiveness is to link the allocation of 
funds directly to the performance of its agents. The success of effective service providers is 
largely based on incentive systems that provide financial rewards for good performers. In the case 
of the Fraunhofer Society (FhG) in Germany, those FhG research institutes that successfully forge 
links with private companies are given additional public funding.19 We propose that the two sub-
systems of service provision (funding and delivery) be governed by internal incentive systems 
based on appropriate performance criteria:  
— This would imply that decision-makers and staff in the funding organization should not be 
paid for spending funds in a certain period but that their remuneration should be based in part 
on the ratio of provable outcomes to invested funds. Where this is not possible, e.g. due to tra-
ditional remuneration systems in the public sector, other tangible incentives should be estab-
lished, e.g. incentives related to the ratio between the funds controlled by organization teams 
or individuals and past performance. This kind of outcome-based incentive would induce ma-
nagers and decision-makers to select the most promising service provider in those areas where 
competition exists and always to monitor the compliance of service providers with the agreed 
tasks or output. 
— The most powerful incentive for good performance on the level of service provision is compe-
tition between providers. There is no reason why service providers – even public or semi-
public organizations – should not compete against one another for funding.20 Depending on 
the kinds of service to be provided, different forms of competition may be envisioned. To 
avoid moral hazard, there would have to be clear and transparent evaluation criteria, and whe-
never possible third parties should be involved in the selection process. Competition should in 
general be founded on previous performance and/or presentation of the best (most targeted, 
most innovative, highest-outreach or -impact) business plan or plan of action. A demand-led 
and carefully directed approach would in this case be the natural reaction of the service pro-
viders. 
 
                                                     
17  See McVay (1999) and McVay (2000). 
18  Levitsky (2000, 60); Tanburn (2002, 62); Reichert / Lempelius / Tomecko (2000). 
19  See http://www.fhg.de. 
20  Where this is not possible, e.g. in specialised technology service provision, where a “natural monopoly” exists due to 
indivisibility of equipment and low density of demand in DC, a clear performance-based system of internal incentives 
should be introduced within the organization itself. 
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Box 8: What performance should be measured? 
The existing concepts of performance measurement consider various dimensions, namely scale/outreach, 
impact and cost-effectiveness/sustainability. 
These three dimensions are treated as though they could be reached simultaneously and independently, so that 
overall performance would be the sum of outreach, impact and financial sustainability. We consider it neces-
sary, however, to analyse the trade-offs between the different dimensions as well as to define priorities.  
1. Financial sustainability vs. impact: As we have shown in our discussion of different forms of market 
failure (Chapter 3), there is a trade-off between the marketability, and thus the financial sustainability, of 
services and their “strategic character,” which in some ways is the basis of its impact on target groups. It is 
evident that routine services, such as accountancy or laboratory testing, are easy to commercialise, either 
because their use is stipulated by law (“LRBS”) or because the costs are relatively low and appropriability 
and predictability of results or outcome are high. Empirical observations indicate that former (non-
sustainable) providers of high-end technology services may become (sustainable) providers of standardized 
services, e.g. in the area of consultancy, metrology and testing, once public funding is severely reduced. In 
fact, some of the Thai institutions that are obliged to become financially sustainable, like the Electrical and 
Electronics Institute, are increasingly focusing on standardized services, sacrificing specialized low-volume 
services. Without doubt, an adequate supply of standardized services is important for the competitiveness of 
industry. On the other hand, their impact on SMEs is limited to the resolution of day-to-day problems and 
easily perceived needs. Thus they cannot contribute to the “great leap” often necessary if firms are to be able 
to compete and survive under rapidly changing market conditions.  
2. Outreach vs. financial sustainability: If we define outreach simply as the number of deliveries of a spe-
cial service, outreach and sustainability may not be conflicting goals, because an increased number of deliver-
ies gives rise to economies of scale and thus makes commercial success easier to attain. But outreach, the 
term used in BS/BDS related documents, has other connotations as well, and when it is used in this way, there 
definitely are trade-offs between outreach and financial sustainability. Let us first take the geographical con-
notation of the term. Many business services may be provided successfully in urban agglomerations, whereas 
they may remain far from the “break-even point” in rural areas, where solvent customers are rare and transac-
tion costs high. In some markets, this problem may be resolved through concessionary models that oblige 
service providers to cross-subsidize from commercially attractive areas to areas that are required to be cov-
ered e.g. for social reasons. Outreach can also be defined with regard to special target groups. Empirical evi-
dence shows that in pursuing a sustainability strategy service providers tend to target higher-income clients, 
“leaving a typical market gap in serving the poor”.a 
3. Outreach vs. impact: Finally, there often is a trade-off between the outreach of a service or a group of 
services and the expected impact on the target group. Many high-end services (e.g. technology generation and 
transfer) are highly specific in character and sometimes have to be developed and improved in close interac-
tion with users. In this case, the outreach of the service (measured as the number of clients served or of “de-
liveries”) will be limited as compared to more generic services, but impact may be high if the respective high-
end services are essential for developing a competitive cluster of enterprises that generates substantial spill-
overs for the national economy.  
Prior to any intervention in the local service market, objectives and performance indicators should be clearly 
defined. It should be kept in mind that the different dimensions of BS/BDS performance cannot be reached 
simultaneously and that priorities should be determined in advance. In most cases, this will not mean pursu-
ing only impact or financial sustainability or outreach, neglecting the other dimensions, but it does imply a 
weighted combination of the three dimensions. We propose using the “performance triangle” as a tool helpful 
in visualizing priorities and establishing performance criteria in BS/BDS development. The instrument is 
useful in structuring discussions and reaching a common understanding of the priorities assigned to the three 
dimensions of performance. 
a McVay / Miehlbradt (2000, 25); see also Tomesen / Gibson (1999) 
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6. Compulsory co-financing. To ensure ownership of the recipient SMEs with regard to the services 
provided, every transaction should be partly financed by the customer. The proportion of co-
financing will depend on the character of the service and the final end of service provision. There 
are additional factors to be considered, such as the business environment and changes in the insti-
tutional setting. Services with predictable and appropriable outcomes should be largely financed 
by the customer, while in some strategic areas it will be necessary to step up the share of funds 
transferred. Also, external framework conditions are relevant: In cases in which the SMEs may be 
operating under conditions of economic growth, or at least stability, a higher proportion of private 
financing should be expected. On the other hand, whenever the macroeconomic conditions are 
changing rapidly, and competition is becoming life-threatening for many companies, governments 
or other funding organizations may opt for a higher share of subsidies, stressing short-term impact 
and outreach, and temporarily sidelining aspects of financial sustainability.  
 
Graphic 1: “The performance triangle” – a tool to visualize outcome dimensions of BDS 
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